About

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Rochester, advised by William Thomson. I am on the academic job market in 2026–27 and expect to complete my Ph.D. in December 2026.

My research asks how digital platforms should divide revenue or cost among their participants: revenue sharing in crowdfunding (Kickstarter, Wefunder), cost division in ride-sharing (UberX Share), and subscription fees in music streaming (Spotify). Using the axiomatic approach, I characterize the allocation rules that satisfy fairness and incentive properties tailored to each setting, and show that the terms platforms actually use are members of the families I characterize.

  • Microeconomic theory
  • Economic design
  • Fair division
  • Platform economics

Job market paper

  1. Fair Allocations in Crowdfunding: Order-Augmented Revenue-Sharing Problems

    Single-authored · under review at Operations Research

    Characterizes the two families of rules that reconcile proportionality with priority for early backers, shows that the revenue-sharing notes and early-bird terms used in practice are members of these families, and embeds the rules in a contribution game with an all-or-nothing funding goal.

    Extended abstract

    A backer of a crowdfunding campaign is described by how much they contributed and how early. When the project's revenue, which may fall short of or exceed the total contribution, is divided among the backers, proportionality rewards the amount, priority rewards earliness, and the two conflict. I formalize this situation as an order-augmented revenue-sharing problem: agents contribute positive amounts in a given order, the project yields a revenue, and a rule divides it, never paying a backer more than their contribution when the project fails or less when it succeeds. Two benchmark rules embody the competing principles: the proportional rule (Prop) rewards amounts; the sequential priority rule (SP), which serves agents one at a time in the order of arrival, rewards earliness.

    Motivated by the early-bird policies observed in practice, I propose order preservation in award rates: each agent's award rate (award per unit of contribution) should be at least as high as that of any subsequent agent. I pair it with adaptations of classical principles: anonymity; revenue monotonicity; consistency (re-applied to any subgroup, dividing among them exactly what it awarded them, the rule confirms each member's award) and its weakening early consistency, imposed only on initial segments of the queue; increment-ratio invariance (additional revenue is divided among unconstrained agents in proportions depending only on their positions); and merging-proofness and splitting-proofness (immunity to manipulation through multiple accounts).

    Theorem 1. A rule satisfies order preservation in award rates, revenue monotonicity, and consistency if and only if it is a switching rule: it selects a set of benchmark levels of the total award rate at which awards are divided strictly proportionally, and gives absolute priority to earlier agents between consecutive levels. Anonymity is implied, not assumed.

    Theorem 2. A rule satisfies order preservation in award rates, anonymity, increment-ratio invariance, and early consistency if and only if it is a sequential weighted proportional rule: positions are graded into seniority tiers, as claims are graded into tranches in a debt contract, and within a tier awards are proportional to position-weighted contributions. SP is the member whose tiers are all singletons.

    Theorem 3. A rule satisfies order preservation in award rates, consistency, and increment-ratio invariance if and only if it is Prop or SP: the two families meet only at the benchmarks. Adding positivity selects Prop; adding priority in scarcity selects SP.

    Theorem 4. A rule satisfies merging-proofness and splitting-proofness if and only if it coincides with Prop upon failure and, upon success, with a revenue-dependent weighted average of Prop and SP; adding equal treatment of equals singles out the proportional rule.

    The results map onto practice: revenue-sharing notes filed under Regulation Crowdfunding are exactly the splitting-proof switching rules, and early-bird equity terms are single-tier weighted proportional rules. Finally, in a contribution game with an all-or-nothing funding goal, manipulation-proof rules produce the opening-and-deadline campaigns observed in practice, and an early-bird premium enlarges a campaign, and the goals it can reach, only if the timing of funding, not merely its amount, affects what the project earns.

Research

Publications

  1. Three Rules for Airport Problems: Characterizations via Order Preservation, Dispersion Minimization, and Consistency

    Mathematical Social Sciences, 142 (2026), 102543
    Abstract

    We consider a class of cost allocation problems where a public facility is shared by a group of agents with "needs" for it, and these needs possess a "nested" character: a facility accommodating an agent can also accommodate any other agent with a lower need at no extra cost. The facility has to be provided to accommodate all agents, and the question is how to allocate its cost among them. An example is airlines sharing an airstrip; these problems are therefore known as "airport problems". We identify desirable rules through the axiomatic approach and propose three main axioms: (i) order preservation in contribution rates, which requires the order of agents' contribution rates to match the order of their needs; (ii) minimizing the range of contribution rates, which requires that the difference between the highest and lowest contribution rates among agents be minimized; and (iii) single-constraint consistency, an expression of the well-known consistency principle. Drawing inspiration from the literature on economic design, we adapt the proportionality principle to guarantee that no group of agents subsidizes the complementary group; we call the resulting rule the constrained proportional rule. Our main result is that this rule is the only rule satisfying these three axioms. We also provide new characterizations of two other well-known rules: the constrained equal contributions rule is the only rule minimizing the variance of contributions, and the constrained equal benefits rule is the only rule minimizing the range (or variance) of benefits.

  2. Inflationary and Distributional Effects of Fossil Energy Price Fluctuation on the Chinese Economy

    with Z. M. Chen, P. L. Chen, S. Xu, T. Hayat, and A. Alsaedi · Energy, 187 (2019), 115974

Working papers

  1. How to Fairly Share Streams: Index Characterizations for Music Streaming Problems

    with Di Feng · draft available upon request
    Abstract

    We study how a music streaming platform should divide subscription revenue among artists, adopting the axiomatic approach. We introduce the class of floored proportional (FP) indices, which guarantee every artist a baseline reward and thereby compromise between proportionality and equality, a feature demanded by artist campaigns and recent regulation yet absent from existing methods. We characterize FP indices by three requirements: pairwise redistribution invariance, which follows from fair treatment of users and implies resistance to manipulation within artist coalitions; equal treatment of equals, the classic principle of fairness toward artists; and stream responsiveness, a mild requirement that additional streams count in an artist's favor. Strikingly, the revenue floor is not assumed but emerges from these axioms. Replacing equal treatment of equals with null artist characterizes the subclass of weighted proportional (WP) indices. Moreover, under null artist, each of our two principles of fairness toward users singles out one index used in practice: equal impact of streams identifies the pro-rata index, and equal impact of values identifies the user-centric index. Finally, FP rewards coincide with an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, which microfounds the floor as a per-artist disagreement payoff.

Work in progress

  1. No Quality, No Pay: Encouraging High-Quality Data Through Performance-Based Compensation Mechanisms in Discrete Choice Experiments

    with Yicheng Mao · lab experiments in preparation
  2. Beyond Stability: How Residency Placements Shape Long-Run Physician, Patient, and Hospital Outcomes

    with Liuyi Wang · data collection in progress

Teaching

University of Rochester

Lecturer
Principles of Economics · Summer 2024, Summer 2025
Teaching assistant
Topics in Microeconomic Theory · Fall 2025 (Steven Landsburg) Fair Allocation · Fall 2024 (William Thomson) Public Finance · Spring 2024 (Elizabeth Ashby) Intermediate Microeconomics · Fall 2023 (Elizabeth Ashby) Principles of Economics · Spring 2023 (Elizabeth Ashby), Spring 2025 (Daria Bottan) Game Theory · Fall 2022 (Yu Awaya)

References

  • William ThomsonAdvisor · University of RochesterWebsite
  • Paulo BarelliUniversity of Rochester
  • Juan D. Moreno-TerneroUniversidad Pablo de Olavide